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The stock market in China had been volatile wildly in 2015. To maintain the 
market stability, CSRC issued series emergency measures including an enforced 
policy for listed firms that they should implement at least one stability-maintenance 
measures from five options. As one of those options, ESOP aroused great concern at 
that time since it had been unbanned for only a year. There is no doubt that, under 
such regulatory requirements, ESOP has become a half mandatory market value 
management measures instead of an incentive mechanism launching by firms 
spontaneously. Hence, except for the effectiveness of market stability maintenance, 
concerns should be raised both theoretically and practically that whether the incentive 
role of ESOP has been changed by the regulatory enforcement. 
Using the data of Chinese A-share listed firms from July 1
st
 2014 to December 
31
st
 2016, this thesis studies the features of ESOP in China, the impact of the 2015 
Regulatory Requirement on ESOP and the effectiveness of ESOP as a 
stability-maintenance measure. Basing on perspectives of agency theory and signal 
theory, results are shown as follows. First, unlike typical ESOPs in other countries, 
the ESOP in China is a kind of short-term share holding plans only for core 
employees. Second, the incentive role of ESOP has been distorted by the regulatory 
requirements. The market performance of ESOP appears to be positive significantly 
when serving as an incentive mechanism, while it is negative significantly as a half 
mandatory market value management measure. Third, the design of ESOP conveys 
different signals to the market, but these signals will be impacted by the 2015 
Regulatory Requirements also. To be specific, the market performance of ESOPs will 
be better, when the stocks held by ESOP are from private placement, when the ESOP 
covers more employees in the firm, and when the top management team subscribes 
more share in ESOP. But the signals that top management team subscription can 
perform will be weaken under the regulatory requirements. Forth, as a 
stability-maintenance measure, ESOP is helpful for firm to reduce the impact of 
market volatility, but this only exists in firms with high stock price synchronicity. 
Overall, the evidence of this thesis will be helpful in enriching the study of ESOP 
in China, and the government intervention in emerging market. 
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